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Arbitrating Job Security Issues Under
The Public School Code And Act
195-The Neshaminy Legacy
I. Introduction
The topic of public sector labor law has been a constant source
of controversy and discussion,1 and the rights and duties of public
school teachers have been at the forefront of this controversy. Tradi-
tionally, collective bargaining agreements between school districts
and school district employees' labor organizations have contained
provisions dealing with job security,' and the alleged violations of
those provisions proceeded the route of grievance arbitration. Until
recently, allegedly wrongful discharges a of professional employees
1. For an overview of public sector labor law in Pennsylania since the Public Employee
Relations Act was enacted, see Cowden, Rights of Public Employees and Public Employee
Unions Under Article IV of Pennsylvania's Public Employe Relations Act, 83 DICK. L. REV.
685 (1979); Thrush, A Survey of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law in Pennsylvania, 83
DICK. L. REv. 755 (1979); Comment, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under
Pennsylvania's Public Employe Relations Act, 83 DICK. L. REv. 795 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Judicial Review]; Comment, A Power Shift in Public School Management, 80
DICK. L. REV. 795 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Power Shift]; Comment, The
Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania Teachers: A Legal Analysis in Light of the
January 1971 Pittsburgh Dispute,, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 77 (1971); Comment, The Scope of
Collective Bargaining in Public Education Under the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations
Act, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 427 (1976); Comment, Scope of Collective Bargaining Under the Public
Employees' Relations Act, 38 U. PITr. L. REV. 200 (1976).
2. An overwhelming number of collective bargaining agreements limit an employer's
right to discipline. Close to 90% of union contracts nationwide specify that employees may not
be discharged without "just cause." H. DAVEY, M. BOGNANNO AND D. ESTERSON, CONTEMPO-
RARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 281 (4th ed. 1982). From an employee's point of view, the
optimum job security provision permits an employee to grieve any adverse personnel action by
his employer. The following model "just cause" clause is representative of those bargained
between PSEA locals and employer school districts:
No member of the bargaining unit shall be discharged, disciplined, sus-
pended, furloughed/laid off, reprimanded, adversely or unsatisfactorily evalu-
ated, reduced in rank or compensation, transferred, reassigned, or deprived of
any professional advantage without just cause.
PSEA Staff, Collective Bargaining Reference Manual 35 (1979).
3. The term "wrongful discharge" has become a term of art denoting the cause of action
that a person employed at will (i.e., without contract) may maintain when discharged in viola-
tion of a "clear mandate of public policy." See Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974). Although the cause of action has not been fully recognized by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, the court in Geary indicated that, given the right fact situation, it would
allow a discharged employee to maintain a cause of action. See also Decker, At-Will Employ-
ment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal For its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L.
REV. 477 (1983); Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abu-
could proceed through the grievance procedure, culminating in arbi-
tration, so long as it appeared that the parties had agreed to do so in
the collective bargaining agreement itself." The Public Employe Re-
lations Act of 1970 (Act 195)5 made arbitration of all grievances
arising out of a collective bargaining agreement between profes-
sional employees 7 and school districts mandatory. 8
In July 1983, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Neshaminy Federation of Teachers v. Neshaminy School District9
(Nesharniny), handed down a decision that representatives of the
public sector labor field viewed as "devastating" 10 and "totally unex-
pected."11 In Neshaminy, the court held that a professional em-
ployee's dismissal was not arbitrable for two reasons: (1) the parties
to the collective bargaining agreement did not intend dismissals to be
arbitrable by the mere negotiation of a "just cause discipline" 2
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
For purposes of this comment, however, the term "wrongful discharge" means a discharge
which is in violation of statute or collective bargaining agreement.
4. See infra notes 130-190 and accompanying text for discussion of judicial standards of
review of arbitration awards,
5. Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. 563 No. 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-
1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84). Act 195 is the common name for the Public Employees'
Relations Act. The name is derived from its order of enactment in the 1970 General Session.
6. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract between an employer and employees;
all rights flowing from it are contractual rights. Thus, this comment will use the terms "collec-
tive bargaining agreement," "contract," and "agreement" interchangeably.
7. "Professional Employee," as used in the Public School Code, is a term of art referring
to all tenured teachers. The definitions of the two classes of school employees to which this
comment will refer are as follows:
i) The term "professional employee" shall include those who are certificated as
teachers, supervisors, supervising principals, principals, assistant principals, vice
principals, directors of vocational education, dental hygienists, visiting teachers,
home and school visitors, school counselors, child nutrition program specialists,
school librarians, school secretaries, the selection of whom is on the basis of
merit as determined by eligibility lists and school nurses.
3) The term "temporary professional employee" shall mean any individual who
has been employed to perform, for a limited time, the duties of a newly created
position or of a regular professional employee whose services have been termi-
nated by death, resignation, suspension, or removal.
Act of Mar. 10, 1949, Pub. L. 30, art. XI, § 1101, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1101
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
The distinguishing feature between "professional employees" and "temporary professional
employees" is that professional employees have acquired tenure. See Phillippi v. School Dist.
of Springfield Township, 28 Pa. Commw. 185, 367 A.2d 1133 (1977).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84) (for text of Section
1101.903, see infra note 40). The effect of Act 195 upon public school teachers has been the
source of much criticism. For a brief and informative review of the effectiveness of Act 195 in
negotiations between state employees and the state, see Brutto, Act 195 Has Been Effective for
State, Sunday Patriot-News, Sept. 11, 1983, at D 1.
9. 501 Pa. 534, 462 A.2d 629 (1983).
10. Letter from Anthony D. Newman, General Counsel for the Pennsylvania State Edu-
cation Association (PSEA), to PSEA Field Staff and Regional Attorneys (July 14, 1983).
11. Telephone Interview with Michael Brodie, Attorney of Record for the Federation of
Teachers in Neshaminy (Sept. 8, 1983).
12. The "just cause" discipline clause provided that: "An Employee will not be disci-
plined, reprimanded, reduced in rank, contractual compensation or contractual advantage
clause, and (2) more crucially, to allow dismissals's to be arbitrated
would supersede the Public School Code14 and violate Act 195.1'
In determining that a "discipline" clause did not include dismis-
sals and that the arbitrator's award was therefore not rationally de-
rived from the collective bargaining agreement, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has raised questions about the scope of appellate review
of an arbitrator's award in the public sector.16 More importantly, the
court's conclusion that professional employee dismissals apparently
are per se not arbitrable creates considerable confusion regarding the
decision's impact upon other employer actions, as well as upon other
classes of employees.
17
This comment will analyse the impact and implications of the
Neshaminy opinion that the arbitration of professional employee dis-
missals violates the Public School Code and Act 195,'8 address the
inequities that Neshaminy has created and discuss three proposals
that the General Assembly seriously should consider in order to
avoid an unfair system of teacher tenure,1" and finally, discuss the
ongoing struggle of determining the appropriate standard of review
of public sector arbitration awards, and evaluate the application of
that standard2 ° both in general terms and in light of Neshaminy.2'
without just cause. Any just [sic] actions asserted by the board or any agent or representative
thereof should be subject to the grievance procedure herein described." Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the Neshaminy Federation of Teachers and the Neshaminy School Dis-
trict, Art. IV, § 4-2, quoted in Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 541, 462 A.2d at 633.
The other agreement provision relevant to discussion of Neshaminy provided that: "Noth-
ing contained herein shall supersede the provisions of the school laws of Pennsylvania, 1949, as
amended, or other applicable laws and regulations." Id. at § 4-1, quoted in Neshaminy, 501
Pa. at 541, 462 A.2d at 632-33.
13. The terms "dismissal" and "discharge" are used interchangeably in this comment.
Each is intended to denote the termination of a contract by an employer, standards for which
are discussed infra note 28.
14. Act of March 10, 1949 Pub. L. 30, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1126 to 11-1131
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703.
16. See generally Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 2 (criticizing the heretofore
accepted standard of review in the public labor sector; see also infra notes 158-199 and accom-
panying text for discussion of the essence test standard of review and its appropriateness in the
public sector, as well as its application in Neshaminy).
17. See supra note 7 for a definition of "temporary professional employee."
18. See infra notes 34-79 and accompanying text. Neshaminy has created a situation in
which tenured teachers are provided less protection from unjust discharges than are non-ten-
ured teachers who have negotiated a dismissal clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
In theory, a tenured teacher has greater rights than a nontenured teacher since the School
Code mandates a dismissal hearing only for tenured teachers. In practice, however, nontenured
teachers have greater rights because of the opportunity to choose their forum of review. See
infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. Further, where suspension and demotion procedures
have been included in the collective bargaining agreement, tenured teachers now have more
protection when suspended or demoted than when discharged. See infra notes 89-98 and ac-
companying text.
19. See infra notes 80-129 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 130-198 and accompanying text.
21. Although it is generally agreed that an arbitrator's award will not be overturned so
long as it is rationally derived from or within the "essence" of the collective bargaining agree-
II. The Supreme Court Decision in Neshaminy
A. Factual Background of Neshaminy
Robert Hess began teaching in the Neshaminy School District
in 1965 and subsequently had been granted tenure. 2 In August
1977, Mr. Hess began to drink heavily because of the pressure and
tension of a hostile relationship with his ex-wife.' On September 24,
1977, Hess started drinking heavily following a heated dispute with
his ex-wife and an encounter with additional anxieties at home.'
4
Sometime around 3:00 a.m. that night, after a drinking binge of
some nine hours, Hess woke his wife and threatened to kill himself
and "all the others" with a shotgun." The police were alerted, ar-
rived, and arrested him." The day after his release from jail, Hess
began out-patient treatment at an alcoholic treatment center and
joined Alcoholics Anonymous.27 Although he missed two days of
ment, see Scranton Fed'n of Teachers v. Scranton School Dist., 498 Pa. 58, 444 A.2d 1144
(1982); Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981); Ringgold
Area School Dist. v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 489 Pa. 380, 414 A.2d 118 (1980), the adoption of
this "essence test" since enactment of Act 195 has not been a smooth one. See infra notes 152-
162 and accompanying text.
Additionally, commentators have attacked the "essence test" as inappropriate in public
sector labor disputes; at times, Pennsylvania appellate courts have given it nothing more than
lip service. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 811-815. The "essence test" is no
less appropriate in the public sector than in the private sector. Courts should not substitute
their own judgment for that of the arbitrators, (as was done in Neshaminy), especially under
the guise of the "essence test."
As discussed later in this comment, an appellate court must accept the arbitrator's version
of the facts when reviewing an arbitration award and limit its determination to whether the
award was rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. The court inquires
only into legal error and whether the award drew its essence from the agreement. See Mc-
Keesport Area School District v. McKeesport Area Educ. Ass'n, 56 Pa. Commw. 224, 424
A.2d 979 (1981); see also Community College of Beaver County v. Community College, Soci-
ety of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). See discussion, infra notes 163-175
and accompanying text.
22. Hess taught junior high school in another school district from 1958 to 1965. W.
Weinberg, Award of Arbitrator in the Arbitration between Neshaminy School District and
Neshaminy Federation of Teachers at 12 [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Award].
23. Hess' ex-wife apparently contacted friends, the school administration, police, rela-
tives, and others, in what Hess believed was an irrational campaign of harassment. The rela-
tionship was decidedly abrasive on matters of visitation involving their children. Id.
24. On that day, when he went to pick up his children in the morning, Hess' ex-wife
subjected him to "screaming and hollering" which left him shaken. At dinner time, Hess was
repulsed by an uninvited guest who had launched into a dissertation of his own domestic diffi-
culties. After the uninvited guest and Mrs. Hess' adult daughter and son-in-law departed for
the evening, the Hesses argued, sometimes heatedly. When the three guests returned, at ap-
proximately 2:30 a.m., Hess felt that they were embarrassed by him. He continued to resent
the uninvited guests for having stirred things up. Id. at 12-13.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Mrs. Hess was able to awaken her daughter and alert her to the gravity of the
situation. The daughter and her husband escaped from the house by tying bedsheets together
and climbing out a window. They subsequently notified the police. Id. at 13.
27. Hess was under the care of a counselor at the alcoholic treatment center. He also
began therapy with a psychiatrist. His wife, who had left him to stay with relatives the day
after the incident, was so impressed with his efforts that following a second courtship she
work while in jail following his arrest, he resumed teaching without
problem or complaint. Nine months later the school board dis-
missed2 8 him for "immorality,"" after he was convicted of simple
assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, terroristic
threats, and unlawful restraint against his wife.80 Pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement, Hess took his dismissal to arbitra-
tion, thus foregoing his right of appeal to the Secretary of Educa-
tion."1 After determining that "dismissals were included in the col-
lective bargaining agreement by virtue of a discipline clause,"3 the
arbitrator held that Hess had not been dismissed for just cause. 3
reconciled with him prior to the Thanksgiving holidays. Id. at 14.
28. The provisions relating to dismissal procedure are contained in the Public School
Code, tit. 24, §§ 11-1126 to 11-1131. Section 11-1127 provides in part:
Before any professional employee . . . having attained the status of perma-
nent tenure is dismissed by the Board of School Directors, such Board of School
Directors shall furnish such professional employee with a detailed written state-
ment of the charges upon which his or her proposed dismissal is based and shall
conduct a hearing ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
Section I 1-1131 provides in part:
In case the professional employee concerned considers himself or herself ag-
grieved by the action of the Board of School Directors, an appeal . . . may be
taken to the Superintendent of Public Instruction at Harrisburg. Such appeal
shall be filed within thirty (30) days after receipt by registered mail of the writ-
ten notice of the decision of the Board ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1131 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
29. Under § 1 I-1122 of the Public School Code, "immorality" is one cause for which a
school district may validly terminate a professional employee's contract. Section I1-1122 pro-
vides in part:
The only valid causes for termination of a contract hereafter entered into
with a professional employee shall be immorality, incompetency, intemperance,
cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, advocation of or participat-
ing in unAmerican or subversive doctrines, persistent and willful violation of the
school laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the professional
employee ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has defined immorality under this section as such
"a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to youth
whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and elevate." Penn Delco School Dist. v. Urso, 33
Pa. Commw. 501, 510, 382 A.2d 162, 167 (1978).
30. Hess was found not guilty of terroristic threats against his son, Preston Hess, and his
wife's daughter and son-in-law, Karen and Kevin Amey. He was sentenced to fifteen days of
limited confinement, which meant that he-was released during each day. Arbitration Award at
14.
31. Section 1 I-1131 of the School Code, see supra note 28, which provides for the ap-
peal of a school board dismissal, refers to the "Superintendent of Public Instruction at Harris-
burg." As utilized in the School Code, this title is synonymous with "Secretary of Education."
32. See Article IV, § 4-2 of the collective bargaining agreement, supra note 12. See also
infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text for discussion of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
holding that the "just cause" standards in a collective bargaining agreement are not in conflict
with expressed statutory reasons for employer actions, such as suspension, demotion, or
dismissal.
33. See infra notes 178-189 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the
reasonableness of the arbitrator's conclusion that the dismissal was not for "just cause."
B. Review of Neshaminy in Context of Supreme Court Precedent
1. The Rule in Neshaminy.-In Neshaminy, the parties had
agreed at the collective bargaining stage that no professional em-
ployee could be "disciplined . . .without just cause." At arbitration,
Hess was awarded reinstatement after the arbitrator determined that
"discipline" included "dismissals," and that Hess was dismissed
without "just cause." On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that a dispute over the dismissal of a professional employee is
not arbitrable," ' and that the dismissal provisions of the Public
School Code are exclusive 5 with respect to professional employee
dismissals.36 In so holding, the court made a de novo factual deter-
mination that "dismissals" were not covered by the "discipline"
clause. It reasoned that since the School Code requires a school
board hearing in professional employee dismissals, 7 and since the
34. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 547-50, 462 A.2d at 636-37.
35. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the causes for dismissal are controlled
by the Public School Code because the Code mandates a hearing before the school board. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1122, 11-1127. The court reasoned that "[a] valid dismissal of a
tenured professional employee can be effected only if the school district acts in full compliance
with these legislatively prescribed procedures. Thus, the Board could not properly agree to
pursue dismissals by a non-statutory method." Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 548, 462 A.2d at 636
(citations omitted, emphasis in original).
36. The supreme court recognized that the statutory dismissal standards and procedural
requirements did not apply to temporary professional employees. However, the court incor-
rectly concluded that the School Code provided the professional employee with greater protec-
tion than was afforded a temporary professional employee. The court noted:
The Code's substantive limitations on the range of grounds for dismissals,
together with its mandated procedural safeguards, are to be recognized as emol-
uments of tenured professional status. No such limitations or procedures have
been prescribed in the case of other classes of employees subject to dismissal.
Id. at 548, 462 A.2d at 636.
For criticism and analysis of the court's mistaken notion that its interpretation left profes-
sional employees with greater protection than temporary professional employees, see infra
notes 176-189 and accompanying text.
37. In numerous other states a dismissal hearing is, unlike in Pennsylvania, explicitly at
the option of the tenured teacher. See, e.g., CAL. [EDUC.] CODE § 44934 (West Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 14 § 1413 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.36(6) (West Supp.
1983); MD. CODE ANN. § 6-202 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 42 (West
Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. [EDUC.] LAW § 3020-a(5) (McKinney 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
3319.16 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 §§ 563, 2004 (1983). New Jersey law
provides that a tenured employee could be dismissed "only after a hearing." N.J. STAT. ANN.
18A:6-10 (West Supp. 1983-84).
In a case similar to Neshaminy, the Vermont Supreme Court held that a school board
could lawfully agree to a "just cause" dismissal clause in the agreement. The court held that
despite a statute that gave the school board sole power to hire and dismiss and that stated that
such power could not be delegated, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 563, the parties to the contract
could submit dismissals to arbitration. Danville Bd. of School Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271,
315 A.2d 473 (1974).
In other states, courts have held that where an employee had the right to a hearing before
being dismissed, he could instead utilize the grievance procedure if the contract so provided.
See Public Employee Relations Comm. v. District School Bd., 374 So.2d 1005 (Fla.App.
1979); Sullivan v. Town of Belmont, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 386 N.E.2d 1288 (1979); Board of
Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 282
N.E.2d 109 (1972).
parties agreed that the contract was not to supersede the School
Code, they did not intend to include "dismissals" in the "discipline"
clause.
In concluding that "dismissals" were not included within the
"discipline" language, the court relied on its interpretation of section
703 of Act 195, which prohibits a contract provision from conflicting
with the School Code. 8 Since the court held that the School Code
hearing is the exclusive forum for the dismissal of professional em-
ployees, it reasoned that the arbitration of dismissals under a just
cause discipline clause conflicted with the Code and thus violated
Act 195. The court therefore concluded that arbitration of profes-
sional employee dismissals is illegal.3 9
Unfortunately, Neshaminy is inconsistent with other Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court decisions addressing the interrelationship be-
tween section 703 of Act 195 and the Public School Code, and sec-
tion 903 of Act 195,40 which mandates arbitration of grievances
arising out of collective bargaining agreement provisions. An analy-
sis of those cases will reveal that Neshaminy is irreconcilable with
the other applicable decisions.
2. Predecessors to Neshaminy.-In Board of Education of
the School District of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Federation of
New Jersey's courts have concluded that mandated statutory procedures for the review of
disciplinary matters could not be changed or modified, such as by submitting a dispute to
arbitration. See Dunnellen Bd. of Ed. v. Dunnellen Ed. Assn., 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737
(1973); City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Ben. Assoc., 179 N.J. Super. 137,
430 A.2d 961 (1981).
38. Section 703 of Act 195 provides:
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or imple-
ment a provision in the collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of
that provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with
any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania or the provisions of Municipal Home Rule Charters.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
39. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 547-50, 462 A.2d at 636-37.
40. Section 903 of Act 195 provides:
Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The procedure to
be adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step
shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of
arbitrators as the parties may agree. Any decisions of the arbitrator or arbitra-
tors requiring legislation will only be effective if such legislation is enacted:
(1) If the parties cannot voluntarily agree upon the selection of an arbitrator, the
parties shall notify the Bureau of Mediation of their inability to do so. The Bu-
reau of Mediation shall then submit to the parties the names of seven arbitra-
tors. Each party shall alternately strike a name until one name remains. The
public employer shall strike the first name. The person remaining shall be the
arbitrator.
(2) The costs of arbitration shall be shared equally by the parties. Fees paid to
arbitrators shall be based on a schedule established by the Bureau of Mediation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
Teachers Local No. 3, AFT, AFL-CIO,4 (Philadelphia Federation
of Teachers), the supreme court held that a school district may
agree in a collective bargaining agreement to submit the propriety of
discharging a non-tenured teacher to arbitration. 42 The Board's un-
successful argument'3 was nearly identical to the one that was ac-
cepted in Neshaminy. The Board alleged that the dismissal powers
set forth in the Public School Code" were exclusive, and therefore
any attempt to delegate those powers to an arbitrator would there-
fore violate section 703 of Act 195."' The court held that "[tihe
mere fact that a particular subject matter may be covered by legisla-
tion does not remove it from collective bargaining. . . . Section 703
only prevents the agreement to and implementation of any term
which would be in violation of or inconsistent with any statutory di-
rective.'4 The court recognized that arbitration under Act 195 is
not only favored, but mandatory,'7 and held that the dismissal of a
41. 464 Pa. 92, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
42. Id. at 93, 346 A.2d at 36.
43. In the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers case, the school board sought to enjoin
the arbitration of a temporary professional employee dismissal on the ground that an agree-
ment to arbitrate such discharges was "an unlawful delegation of the exclusive power of the
board." The Board contended that the provisions in the agreement illegally delegated powers
conferred exclusively on the Board by sections 510, see infra note 115, and 514, see infra note
44, of the Public School Code. Thus, the Board maintained that the dismissal provisions of the
contract were invalid under section 703 of Act 195. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 464 Pa. at
95-97, 346 A.2d at 37.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v.
State College Area School District, see infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text, held that
the Board's power was not infringed by an agreement to arbitrate dismissals under a "just
cause" standard. The court reasoned that Act 195 altered some of the Board's previously ex-
clusive control by expressly requiring arbitration in all disputes.
44. The relevant School Code dismissal provisions for a temporary professional employee
are in dispute. The majority in Philadelphia Federation of Teachers stated that section 514 of
the School Code applied. That section provides:
The Board of School Directors in any school district except as herein other-
wise provided, shall after due notice, giving the reasons therefor, and after hear-
ing if demanded, have the right at any time to remove any of its officers, employ-
ees, or appointees for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of
any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
45. See supra note 38.
46. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. at 97, 346 A.2d at 38.
47. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for the statutory requirement that
grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the interpretation
or application of the agreement, there must be a mechanism for resolving the
dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Historically, the primary means of
resolving such disputes was the strike, and many agreements in the private sec-
tor retain this mechanism for at least some types of dispute. However, the reso-
lution of all disputes by resort to economic force is costly to the parties, and
more importantly, to the public. The General Assembly, therefore, chose to
make the widely used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the [Pub-
lic Employe Relations Act]. This brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators
to bear on the often difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining
agreement while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guar-
anteeing both parties and the public that such disputes will not disrupt peaceful
temporary professional employee was arbitrable. s
The issue of arbitrability under Act 195 of an employee dismis-
sal arose in a non-school setting in Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bar-
gaining Committee v. City of Pittsburgh49 (Pittsburgh). In Pitts-
burgh, the supreme court's analysis fell short of determining whether
inclusion of a dismissal provision"0 in the collective bargaining agree-
ment conflicted with the Civil Service Act"' and Act 195.52 Rather,
the court held that having agreed at the bargaining stage to submit
dismissals to grievance arbitration, the employer thereafter could not
avoid arbitration by alleging that the agreed upon provision con-
flicted with applicable statutes.5 3 Thus, before Neshaminy, the court
had indicated in Pittsburgh that it would not determine whether the
arbitration of dismissals violated Act 195. The Pittsburgh decision
implies that the question of illegality of a contract dismissal provi-
sion cannot be raised as a bar to arbitration under that provision
because the public employer will be estopped from raising an illegal-
ity argument.
3. The Law After Neshaminy.-The present state of the law
regarding dismissals under the Public School Code and Act 195 is
now most unclear. 54 The Neshaminy court did not specifically over-
labor relations or interrupt public services.
Id. at 100, 346 A.2d at 39.
48. The court did not address the specific issue whether a professional employee's dis-
missal was arbitrable. Nevertheless, it was widely accepted until Neshaminy that the same
reasoning and policy factors required the same result with regard to tenured teachers. See
infra note 172. Commentators believed that Philadelphia Federation of Teachers was the de-
finitive statement with regard to the arbitration of all dismissals. See Comment, A Power Shift
in Public School Management, supra note 1, at 815-16.
49. 481 Pa. 66, 391 A.2d 1318 (1978).
50. For a discussion of the disputed collective bargaining agreement provisions in Pitts-
burgh, see id. at 68-69, 391 A.2d at 1319.
51. Act of June 7, 1917, Pub. L. No. 609, § i, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23401-23462
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
52. In rejecting the employer's argument that it could not agree to submit an employee
dismissal to arbitration, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that:
To permit an employer to enter into agreements and include terms such as
grievance arbitration which raise the expectations of those concerned, and then
to subsequently refuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack of
capacity would invite discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a
harmonious relationship would virtually be impossible to maintain.
Good faith bargaining would require that questions as to the legality of the
proposed terms of a collective bargaining agreement should be resolved by the
parties to the agreement at the bargaining stage.
481 Pa. at 74-75, 391 A.2d at 1322-23.
53. For a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case applying the same analysis and rea-
soning in estopping an employer from asserting an illegality argument, see Fraternal Order of
Police v. Hickey, 499 Pa. 194, 452 A.2d 1005 (1982). The agreement between the city and the
policemen's union provided that the Chief of Police was to be selected from within the ranks of
the police force. The city subsequently attempted to hire an outsider and charged that the
relevant provision was unenforceable because it was illegal. The court held the city to the
provisions of the agreement on an estoppel theory.
54. The Pennsylvania School Boards' Association, Inc., however, has stated that the
rule either Philadelphia Federation of Teachers or Pittsburgh, al-
though Neshaminy made reference to both cases.55 An analysis of
these three cases leads to several possible interpretations regarding
dismissals.
The first possible interpretation is that the Neshaminy decision
purports to declare that any dismissal clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement violates Act 195. On the other hand, Pittsburgh holds
that regardless whether a dismissal clause conflicts with the statute,
any party who agrees to arbitrate dismissals in a collective bargain-
ing 'agreement is estopped from raising the illegality argument.
Thus, where a contract presently contains a "just cause" dismissal
clause, the Neshaminy decision should be irrelevant, 56 since the con-
tract there at issue contained only a "just cause" discipline clause.
5 7
Collective bargaining agreements, however, are not perpetual.
Before expiration, the Board and the union begin to bargain for a
successor agreement. Because of Neshaminy, a public employer
should undoubtedly propose that a "just cause" dismissal clause be
omitted from the new agreement due to illegality. Thus, while
Neshaminy should not change the status of an existing agreement
that contains a "just cause" dismissal clause due to the Pittsburgh
decision,58 it will have a heavy impact on future bargaining and de-
prive unions of bargaining leverage. If the parties nonetheless in-
clude a "just cause" dismissal provision in the contract, any attempt
to prevent its enforcement should be estopped, based on the Pitts-
burgh rationale.
The second possible interpretation rests upon the Neshaminy
parties' negotiation of a provision that "nothing [in the agreement]
shall supersede ...applicable laws."59 Since the parties thereby
Neshaminy decision "is clear as to its impact on dismissal actions," i.e., any dismissal under
the Public School Code is not arbitrable. Not surprisingly, the School Boards' Association
hails Neshaminy as an excellent decision. Its statement that Neshaminy is clear as to dismis-
sals is no doubt merely a note of optimism on its part, both that the law is now clear and that
it provides school boards with more power and less restrictions. See Dismissal of Professional
Employees: School Code and Just Cause, Employee Relations Guidelines, Vol. XIII, No. 17
(July 26, 1983).
55. See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 539-40, 462 A.2d at 632. The Neshaminy court admit-
ted that the policy in this Commonwealth "not only favors but mandates the submission to
arbitration of public employee grievances," and cited Philadelphia Federation of Teachers as
one of its authorities. Id. Neshaminy cites Pittsburgh as authoritative of the well-settled prin-
ciple that it is the arbitrator who must determine the issue of the scope of grievance arbitra-
tion. Id.
56. The decision would not be irrelevant to the extent that it is now valid law. Any time
a contract contains a dismissal clause, however, the employer should be estopped from raising
the Neshaminy illegality argument. Thus, so long as the contract provided for arbitration of
professional employee dismissals, the Neshaminy decision should not come into play.
57. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 49-53 and accompanying text.
59. 501 Pa. at 541, 462 A.2d at 632-33. See supra note 12 for full text of this provision.
Most collective bargaining agreements between teachers' unions and school districts do not
contain language like the "superseding" clause in Neshaminy. Instead, most so called "statu-
clearly indicated that the collective bargaining agreement was not to
supersede the School Code or Act 195, a dismissal provision included
in the collective bargaining agreement would be illegal, and an es-
toppel theory would not apply. This interpretation relies on the in-
tent of the parties not to supersede relevant statutes (despite an obvi-
ous intent of the parties to arbitrate dismissals, manifested by their
agreement to do so in the collective bargaining agreement). °O Under
this interpretation, however, a collective bargaining agreement that
does not clearly indicate that no provision is to supersede applicable
law," should be permitted to include a dismissal provision, and any
attempt to prevent enforcement of the provision should be estopped,
based on the reasoning in Pittsburgh.2
The third possible interpretation begins with the assumption
that under Neshaminy, tenured teachers may not take their dismis-
sals to arbitration unless they can successfully advance an estoppel
theory, and must instead rely on the School Code procedures." Dis-
missed non-tenured teachers may still go through arbitration, based
on the court's decision in Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. The
relevant distinction between School Code dismissal procedures for
tenured teachers and those for nontenured teachers is that a tenured
teacher facing dismissal gets an automatic hearing before the school
board, while a hearing for a nontenured teacher is at the option of
the dismissed employee." Under Local Agency Law, which is appli-
cable to temporary professional employees, no adjudication is valid
unless the affected employee has been afforded a hearing. 5 This im-
plies a mandatory hearing, thus blurring the procedural distinction
between dismissals of tenured and nontenured teachers. Neverthe-
less, the existence of a hearing mandated by the School Code for
tory savings clauses" are worded differently and purport to preserve for the employee the
rights of applicable law. In other words, typical statutory savings clauses are worded to expand
the employee's rights rather than to limit them. The following is a model "statutory savings
clause" which is recommended by PSEA negotiators to local associations:
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny or restrict to any em-
ployee such rights as may exist under the Public School Code of 1949 as
amended, or other applicable laws and regulations. The rights granted to em-
ployees hereunder shall be deemed to be in addition to those provided elsewhere.
PSEA Staff, Collective Bargaining Reference Manual 35 (1979).
60. See infra notes 163-175 and accompanying text.
61. This interpretation is more reasonable when dealing with a "discipline" clause modi-
fied by a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" clause, than when interpreting a "dismissal" clause
similarly modified. It is unreasonable to hold that an expressed "dismissal" clause is illegal on
the basis of a superseding clause. This would allow parties to agree to any provision, however
questionable, at the bargaining stage, and fight out the legality of the terms in court, so long as
a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" provision was included in the contract.
62. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 28.
64. Compare the procedure for dismissal of a professional employee, supra note 28 with
the procedure for a temporary professional employee dismissal. supra note 44.
65. Act of April 28, 1978, Pub. L. 202 No. 53, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 553
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84). See also infra note 99 (11).
professional employees is the only logical distinction between the dis-
missal standards.
These three possible interpretations present several difficult
problems. As a fundamental rule in the arbitration of contract provi-
sions, the factfinder should attempt to discern the intent of the par-
ties.6 First, the factfinder may reasonably conclude that a bar-
gained-for just cause discipline provision, when read in conjunction
with a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law ' 67 provision, does not in-
clude dismissals, particularly in light of Neshaminy.a
Second, if the contract expressly includes a just cause dismissal
provision and a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" provision, it is un-
reasonable to conclude that the parties did not intend that dismissals
be arbitrated. 69 To prevent estoppel, the parties to the contract must
have confronted the question of the legality of collective bargaining
66. In arbitration, a basic principle of construction of written agreements requires that
the arbitrator attempt to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties. One of the leading
works on arbitration has summarized this premise:
The collective agreement should be construed, not narrowly and technically,
but broadly and so as to accomplish its evident aims.
In determining the intent of the parties, inquiry is made as to what the
language meant to the parties when the agreement was written. It is this mean-
ing that governs, not the meaning that can be possibly read into the language.
The "intent of the parties" rule has been elaborated as follows:
"[I]f the intention of the parties can be clearly discovered, the court will
give effect to it and construe the words accordingly. . . . It is not within the
function of the judiciary to look outside of the instrument to get at the intention
of the parties and then carry out that intention regardless of whether the instru-
ment contains language sufficient to express it; but their sole duty is to find out
what was meant by the language of the instrument. This language must be suffi-
cient, when looked at in the light of such facts as the court is entitled to con-
sider, to sustain whatever effect is given to the instrument."
F. ELKOURI AND E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 302-03, (3d. ed. 1973) (quoting 12
AM. JUR. § 227 at 746-48) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter referred to as ELKOURI].
67. In Neshaminy, the court emphasized that the parties explicitly agreed not to super-
sede relevant School Code provisions. The court stated that since
[t]he Code does not employ the term "discipline," nor does it attempt to estab-
lish standards for its imposition, . . . the use of the term "discipline" in the
Agreement, consistent with the Agreement's stated intention of not superseding
the Code, would appear to refer to actions other than "termination of contract,"
"dismissal" and/or "discharge," which are specifically provided for in the Code.
501 Pa. at 543, 462 A.2d at 633-34.
Whether a less restrictive statutory savings clause, see, e.g., supra note 59, would have the
same effect on a bargained-for "just cause" discipline provision is uncertain. Presumably, a
more liberal statutory savings clause will at least allow an employee to successfully advance an
estoppel theory because (1) the traditional statutory savings provision expands the rights of
employees, rather than limit them, and (2) under the more traditional provision, dismissals
have been arbitrated for several years.
68. Parties to contract negotiations will consider Neshaminy when they sit down at the
bargaining table. If the parties now expressly agree that their contract is not to supersede
applicable law, and explicitly negotiate a just cause discipline clause, they obviously do not
intend to have dismissals arbitrated.
Parties who are bound by contracts that presently include the two abovementioned clauses
will apparently be bound by Neshaminy. This, however, is not necessarily what the parties
intended when negotiating the collective bargaining agreement. See infra notes 163-175 and
accompanying text.
69. See supra note 52; see also infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
agreement terms at the bargaining stage. 0 One cannot bargain for
terms and then later challenge their legality.71 Parties and courts
cannot reasonably contend that the mere inclusion of a "not-to-su-
persede-applicable-law" provision raises the question of the legality
of all terms expressly included in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 72 Nevertheless, this is precisely what the supreme court did in
Neshaminy, indicating that parties can bargain for any terms, legal
or otherwise, and avoid future application of an estoppel theory by
simply including a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" clause. If
under Neshaminy the parties need not challenge the legality of terms
at the bargaining stage, then unethical and fraudulent bargaining
can certainly result.
A third problem arises when a collective bargaining agreement
contains a just cause discipline provision, but not a just cause dismis-
sal clause, and does not contain a "not-to-supersede-applicable-law"
provision. The court in Neshaminy gave great emphasis to the "not-
to-supersede" provision.73  Therefore, dismissals under a collective
bargaining agreement that lacks a "not-to-supersede" provision
should be arbitrable, 4 so long as other indicia of the parties intent
do not demonstrate that they did not intend to include dismissals
within the just cause discipline provision.7
To illustrate the confusion that Neshaminy has now created, the
chart below categorizes the possible outcomes of various collective
bargaining agreement provisions when a professional employee is
dismissed.
70. See supra note 52; see also infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 52; see also infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 52; see also infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text. In Pitts-
burgh, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the illegality argument because the parties
had not challenged the legality of terms at the bargaining stage. 381 Pa. at 75, 391 A.2d at
1322-23. The court neither stated nor implied that the parties could substitute a "not-to-super-
sede-applicable-law" provision for the good faith questioning of the legality of specific terms at
the bargaining stage. Indeed, to allow all terms in the agreement to be included subject to
advance warning that their legality may later be questioned "would invite distrust and create
an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would virtually be impossible to maintain."
Id. at 74, 391 A.2d at 1322. An employer could agree to grant some benefit to the employees,
knowing such benefit to be illegal, in exchange for a concession from the employees' union.
After having received the benefits of the concession, the employer could then have the benefit
struck down under the logic of Neshaminy, because the legality of the term was questioned by
the mere inclusion of the "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" provision.
73. See supra notes 12, 67 and accompanying text.
74. Dismissals are, in fact, the ultimate form of discipline. See infra notes 164-171 and
accompanying text.
75. Under Ludwig-Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1969), see infra notes 154-171 and accompanying text, the "essence test" was modified to look
at all relevant indicia of the parties intent. This is consistent with the contract doctrine that
the law will attempt to interpret a contract as the parties intended. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text. An obvious example of where the indicia of parties intent would indicate
that dismissals were not to be included under a discipline clause would be where there was a
separate clause dealing with the procedures for dismissals.
Does the Agreement
Contain a "Not-To-
Type of Just Cause Supersede-
Provision Being Applicable-Law" In the Dismissal
Interpreted Provision? Arbitrable?
Dismissal No Yes (Pittsburgh)76
Discipline Yes No (Neshaminy)"
7
Dismissal Yes ? (?)78
Discipline No ? (?)79
4. The Inequitable Legacy of Neshaminy.-After
Neshaminy, protection from wrongful discharges for nontenured
teachers whose collective bargaining agreement contains a just cause
discipline provision is now in fact greater than the protection af-
forded tenured teachers.' 0 Under the Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers rationale, nontenured teachers may take their allegedly
wrongful discharges to arbitration or to school board hearings1 or
possibly both,'2 while under the Neshaminy rule, tenured teachers
76. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
78. If Neshaminy is read broadly to conclude that the court meant its decision to apply
to all tenured teacher dismissals, then a dismissal is probably only arbitrable if an estoppel
theory may apply. But see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
79. Under the Neshaminy rationale, dismissals may not be arbitrable because arbitrat-
ing dismissals would supersede the School Code and Act 195. Nevertheless, dismissals should
be arbitrable if it is not shown that the parties intended otherwise, because a dismissal is a
form of discipline, see infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text, and the parties should be
estopped from asserting that the terms are illegal, based on the Pittsburgh decision. See supra
notes 49-64, 73-75 and accompanying text.
80. The purpose of the Teacher's Tenure Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1121-11-
1132, is to maintain an "adequate and competent teaching staff, free from political and per-
sonal arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers might feel secure and
more efficiently perform their duty of instruction. ... Sporie v. Eastern Westmoreland
Area Vo-Tech School, 47 Pa. Commw. 390, 394, 408 A.2d 888, 891 (1979) (quoting Ehret v.
Kulpmont Borough School Dist., 333 Pa. 518, 524-25, 5 A.2d 188, 191-92 (1939)) (emphasis
added). Thus, having earned the status of tenure, an employee should be better protected from
arbitrary employer action than a nontenured teacher. The underlying premise is akin to a
probationary employment. A school district should have more discretion in dismissing tempo-
rary professional employees than a teacher who has qualified for tenured status.
81. See Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. at 93-102, 346 A.2d at 36-40.
82. In West Middlesex Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, PLRB, 55 Pa. Commw.
404, 423 A.2d 78 (1980) the Commonwealth Court held that a professional employee could
have his demotion reviewed via School Code procedures and grievance procedures. If this ra-
tionale is broadly applied, nontenured teachers upon dismissal may be able to proceed to both
arbitration and School Code hearings. The court in West Middlesex concluded:
The remedy provided to a professional employee threatened with demotion by
Section 1151 of the Public School Code . . . tests only whether the proposed
demotion action is arbitrary or based on improper motives ...
The grievance and arbitration procedure provided by the collective bargaining
agreement on the other hand searches whether the school board's action was for
just cause ...
Since the substantive issues under the remedy provided by the bargaining agree-
ment on the one hand and by Section 1151 of the Public School Code . . . on
the other are different, DeLise's resort to grievance and arbitration after attend-
ing the school board's Section 1151 hearing was not the pursuit of an inconsis-
may use only the statutory procedures prescribed by the School
Code.83 Furthermore, school boards cannot provide the employee
with a totally unbiased"' hearing; arbitrators as a matter of practice
are more able to give employees a fair and impartial review.8 5 Thus,
the treatment is inequitably unbalanced, favoring nontenured teach-
ers over tenured teachers. Given the choice of forums (arbitration or
school board hearings), it is not surprising that an employee would
elect arbitration." Since Neshaminy has denied the tenured teacher
this choice, nontenured teachers now have greater leverage and po-
tentially greater rights. This surely cannot be what the legislature
intended by requiring a hearing in professional employee dismissal
cases.87 By enacting teacher tenure laws, the General Assembly
sought to provide the tenured teacher with greater protection than
nontenured teachers"8 from arbitrary dismissals. Neshaminy contra-
dicts this legislative intent, and frustrates the entire purpose of
teacher tenure.
C. The Law After Neshaminy With Respect To Demotions And
Suspensions
In addition to creating confusion for tenured teachers who are
dismissed, Neshaminy also significantly affects the arbitrability of
tent remedy.
Id. at 409, 423 A.2d at 784 (citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added).
83. See supra note 28.
84. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that although School Code dismis-
sal provisions do not violate Constitutional due process rights, c.f. Barndt v. Wissahickon
School Dist., 475 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd 615 F.2d 1352, cert. denied 449 U.S.
831 (1980), a school board hearing cannot be completely unbiased. "At the hearing the board
plays a dual role. It acts as both prosecutor and as judge, and because of this it can never be
totally unbiased." Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. at 104, 346 A.2d at 41,
(quoting Brentwood Borough School Dist. Appeal, 439 Pa. 256, 262, 267 A.2d 848, 851
(1970)).
85. See infra note 125.
86. The permissible reasons for dismissing an employee are not limited by taking a dis-
missal to arbitration. Where there are statutory grounds, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-
1122 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84). the "just cause" standard will be interpreted as the identical
statutory grounds or those grounds plus others. In Neshaminy, for example, the arbitrator
would have applied the statutory "immorality" standard or the immorality standard plus
others. See also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
87. By providing for mandatory review of dismissals in section 11-1127 of the School
Code, the legislature no doubt intended to provide more protection for employees who are
discharged unfairly or arbitrarily than employees who are merely demoted or suspended. It is
therefore anomolous that dismissed employees, having to proceed through a statutory school
board hearing, get less protection than employees faced with demotion or suspension. Both
conceptually and in practice, an arbitrator treats an employee better than the statutory
process.
A contrary legislative intent would encourage school districts to dismiss employees in bor-
der-line cases, rather than discipline them, because the review is more limited. See also supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
88. By definition, the purpose in enacting a teacher tenure law is to provide certain
protections to employees who achieve the status of tenure that are unavailable to nontenured
employees. See also supra notes 79, 87 and accompanying text.
other employer conduct. As noted above, just cause dismissal clauses
for nontenured teachers are still valid since Neshaminy did not over-
rule Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. Nevertheless, Neshaminy
raises additional questions whether other employer actions are arbi-
trable. Specifically, questions arise as to the implications of
Neshaminy with respect to the arbitration of demotions, disciplinary
actions, and suspensions.
1. Demotions.-In Neshaminy the court stated that demo-
tions"of tenured teachers are still arbitrable because (1) the hearing
is at the option of the professional employee, rather than statutorily
mandated, and (2) no statutory grounds are set forth for demotions,
while grounds are set forth for dismissals. 90 Thus, "including demo-
tions among the subjects of mandatory arbitration would not super-
sede or contravene any standard or procedure mandated by the
Code."' 91 This clear statement raises the question whether the critical
factor in the court's analysis is the existence of a statutorily man-
dated hearing or statutorily prescribed reasons92 for the employer ac-
tion or both.
2. Suspensions.-Apparently, Neshaminy does not overrule
Rylke v. Portage Area School District (Rylke). 9 . The supreme court
in Rylke held that Act 195 did not prohibit arbitration of a dispute
arising from an employee's suspension. In contrast to the Neshaminy
dismissal context, the Public School Code" does not mandate that
disputes arising out of the suspension of professional employees be
resolved exclusively by a hearing before the Board of School Direc-
tors. In discussing demotions, the supreme court in Neshaminy
stated that there is no mandatory hearing for demotions, in contrast
to dismissal procedures, thereby implying the importance placed on
the mandatory nature of the proceedings. But under Local Agency
Law,95 a suspended teacher must be afforded a hearing before a final
determination by a school board is valid. Thus, while neither the
School Code nor Local Agency Law requires a hearing before a sus-
pension, a suspended teacher is entitled to a hearing under Local
Agency Law. In discussing the procedural differences between dis-
missals and demotions, the court cited its opinion in Rylke with ap-
89. Standards and procedures for professional employee demotions are covered by sec-
tion 11-1151 of the School Code. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1151 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
90. Standards for professional employee dismissals are contained in section 11-1122 of
the School Code. See supra note 29.
91. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 544, 462 A.2d at 634.
92. See supra note 86.
93. 473 Pa. 481, 375 A.2d 692 (1977).
94. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1124-1125.1.
95. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 553 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
proval.M Thus, suspensions must remain arbitrable, and the critical
factor in determining whether a dispute is arbitrable is the existence
of statutorily mandated procedures97 for a hearing.98
96. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 544, 462 A.2d at 634.
97. Specific statutory standards for suspensions are set forth in the School Code, while
procedural requirements are not. The court, in citing Rylke, implied that the existence of
statutory standards alone will not bar the parties from arbitrating the dispute. Id.
98. The following chart sets forth the factual permutations controlling the arbitrability
of various employer actions.
Type of Employer Are Reasons For Is a School Board Is The Dispute
Action Employer Action Hearing Mandated Arbitrable?
Specified in the by the Code?
School Code?
Dismissal
(Tenured) Yes (1) Yes (2) No (3)
Dismissal
(Nontenured) Yes (4) No (5) Yes (6)
Demotion No (7) No (8) Yes (9)
Suspension Yes (10) No (11) Yes (12)
Discipline No (13) No (14) Yes (15)
(1) See PA. STAT ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122, supra note 29.
(2) See PA. STAT ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127, supra note 28. Section 1127 of the School Code
provides that for dismissal to be valid, the board "shall conduct a hearing." The Neshaminy
court interpreted this as statutorily mandating a hearing which cannot be waived by the par-
ties. See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 547-48, 462 A.2d at 636. Nevertheless, requiring a school
board hearing does not automatically bar arbitration. It is possible that an employee could
have his dismissal reviewed in both forums. Pennsylvania courts have recognized this in mat-
ters of demotions. See supra note 82 and accompany text for discussion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in West Middlesex. Thus, mandating a school board hearing does not
necessarily mean that it is the exclusive forum for review.
(3) See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 547-50, 462 A.2d at 636-37.
(4) See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 5-514, 11-1108. The supreme court held in Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers that the relevant section for a temporary professional employee's dis-
missal was § 514. See supra note 44. Nevertheless, as the dissent in Philadelphia Federation
of Teachers noted, § 1108 provides a clearer and more definite statement of the allowable
causes for dismissal of a temporary professional employee. That section provides in part that
"[no] temporary professional employee shall be dismissed unless rated unsatisfactory, and noti-
fication, in writing, of such unsatisfactory rating shall have been furnished the employee within
ten (10) days following date of such rating."
(5) See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
(6) Id.
(7) See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1151 (Purdon Supp. 1983- 84). Section 1151 provides in
part:
There shall be no demotion of any professional employee either in salary or type
of position, except as otherwise provided in this Act, without the consent of the
employee, or, if such consent is not received, then such demotion shall be subject
to the right of a hearing before the Board of School Directors and an appeal in
the same manner as hereinbefore provided in the case of a dismissal of a profes-
sional employee.
For appeal procedures, see supra § 11-1131 at note 28.
(8) Id.
(9) See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
(10) See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1124 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84). Section 1124 provides in
pertinent part:
Any Board of School Directors may suspend the necessary number of profes-
sional employees for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated:
1) Substantial decrease in pupil enrollment in the school district;
2) Curtailment or alteration of the educational program on recommendation of
3. The Better Legal Trend-Neshaminy Or Its Predeces-
sors?99-A reading of cases interpreting section 703 of Act 195 and
the language of sections 1126-1132 of the School Code reveals that
it was not reasonable for the Neshaminy court to conclude that the
school board hearing is the exclusive forum for review of dismis-
sals. 001n Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area
School District (State College)101 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that "the mere fact that a particular subject matter may be
covered by legislation does not remove it from collective bargain-
ing. .. ."101 The court concluded that an issue is only excluded
from bargaining if "statutory provisions explicitly and definitively
prohibit the public employer from making an agreement as to that
specific term or condition of employment."103 The School Code does
not "explicitly and definitively" prohibit a school district from
agreeing to arbitrate dismissals: it merely insures Board review of an
employee's dismissal. Just as an employee's union can bargain for a
higher salary than the minimum prescribed by law or other benefits
that are greater than those prescribed by statute, a professional em-
ployee should have the opportunity to bargain for the arbitration of
dismissals. Accordingly, a professional employee should be able to
have his dismissal reviewed by a school board, or an arbitrator, or
the superintendent, concurred in by the Board of School Directors, approved by
the Department of Public Instruction. ..
3) Consolidation of schools. .. ;
4) When new school districts are established as the result of reorganization of
school districts. ..;
(11) No School Code provision requires a hearing before suspension. However, under Local
Agency Law, a suspended teacher is to be afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and the
opportunity to be heard before the suspension can be valid. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 553
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84). See Sto-Rox School Dist. v. Horgan, 68 Pa. Commw. 416, 449 A.2d
796 (1982); Eastern York School Dist. v. Long, 46 Pa. Commw. 209, 407 A.2d 69 (1979).
affd. 494 Pa. 105, 430 A.2d 267.
(12) See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 544, 462 A.2d at 634; Rylke v. Portage Area School Dist.,
supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
(13) Section 510 of the School Code permits a school district to adopt reasonable rules and
regulations governing school affairs and the conduct of employees while they are engaged in
their duties. However, no standards or reasons permissible for discipline are prescribed by this
section. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
(14) Section 510 does not prescribe procedures to be employed in the disciplinary process. See
id. Such discipline, however, is controlled also by Local Agency Law, which grants a disci-
plined employee a right to a hearing. See supra note 98(11).
(15) In Neshaminy, the court indicated that a just cause discipline clause was valid and may
be the subject of arbitration because neither standards nor procedures for review were pro-
vided in the School Code. See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 544-46, 462 A.2d at 634-35.
99. See Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, supra notes 38-48 and accompanying
text; Pittsburgh, supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text; Rylke, supra notes 93-98 and
accompanying text.
100. See Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 545-50, 462 A.2d at 634-37.
101. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
102. Id. at 508, 337 A.2d at 269.
103. Id. at 510, 337 A.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
both. 10' This interpretation would be consistent with the State Col-
lege decision as well as the purpose of Act 195.105
Neshaminy is the first case in which the supreme court held
that such a collective bargaining agreement provision violated or was
inconsistent with section 703 of Act 195. In State College, the court
could have justifiably set forth a broader standard for determining
whether section 703 was violated by holding that parties could not
bargain for terms of employment which were already covered by
statute. The State College majority, however, recognized that such
an interpretation would conflict with the purpose of Act 19510, and
merely serve to "further define the distinction between the inherent
managerial prerogative concept set forth in section 702. .. .
After the State College decision and until Neshaminy, the su-
preme court adopted a hands-off position: only in rare circumstances
would it declare collective bargaining agreement provisions illegal. It
was asked on numerous occasions to find that a collective bargaining
agreement provision was inconsistent with the School Code and Act
195.101in nearly every case, however, the court applied the State
College rationale and rejected the argument. 10 9 Neshaminy is a
landmark decision in Act 195 litigation, being inconsistent with the
interpretation of section 703 that the court had been applying since
State College.
In addition to reversing established precedents, which provided
the employee with more protection,110 Neshaminy's inconsistent ap-
plication of section 703 yields a result violative of public policy.
104. See supra note 82.
105. See supra note 80. In State College, the court reasoned that "the passage of Act
195 . . .expresses a manifest intention to create a sufficiently vital collective bargaining pro-
cess capable of meeting the need to restore harmony within the public sector." Id. at 505, 337
A.2d at 267.
In passing Act 195, the General Assembly stated that:
It is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to
promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employees ... [T]he General Assembly has determined that the overall
policy may best be accomplished by. . .(2) requiring public employers to nego-
tiate and bargain ...
PA. STAT ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
106. Cf. West Middlesex, supra note 82; State College, 461 Pa. at 505-506, 337 A.2d at
267.
107. 461 Pa. at 509, 337 A.2d at 269.
108. See, e.g., Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, supra note 41; Pittsburgh, supra
note 49; Millberry v. Board of Ed., 467 Pa. 79, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Scranton Federation of
Teachers v. Scranton School Dist., 45 Pa. Commw. 385, 407 A.2d 61 (1979), appeal dis-
missed, 497 Pa. 346, 440 A.2d 1190 (1982); AFSCME v. City of Reading, 66 Pa. Commw.
539, 445 A.2d 570 (1982).
109. See supra note 108 and cases cited therein; Rylke, supra note 93. But see Cumber-
land Valley Educ. Ass'n. v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 24 Pa. Commw. 167, 354 A.2d
265 (1976) (Sabbatical leave provisions in collective bargaining agreement providing for, inter
alia, full pay for teachers v. sabbatical conflicted with School Code sabbatical leave
provisions).
I10. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
When all the supreme court decisions are read together, the lowest
classified teachers 1 (temporary professional employees) and the
least serious employer actions (demotions) trigger the strongest em-
ployee protections. This result is untenable: it clearly is not within
the intent of the legislature and violates the philosophy of tenure,
which is to protect teachers who have attained certain seniority112
from arbitrary employer actions, including dismissals.113
III. Proposed Strategies After Neshaminy
A. The Long Run-Amending The School Code1 '
The General Assembly could take several routes to soften
Neshaminy's blow, and in turn, return to tenured teachers a fairer
system of review of alleged employer abuses. Three proposals will be
discussed, each of which would provide an equitable system of jus-
tice for tenured teachers, while taking nothing away from the school
district's right to manage its own affairs. 1
111. "Substitute teachers" are actually classified lower than "temporary professional
employees," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101(2), but in this comment any discussion of
substitute teachers has been omitted. Substitute teachers do not share similar rights with pro-
fessional employees and temporary professional employees; in this comment, temporary profes-
sional employees are referred to as the lowest classified teachers for School Code protection
purposes.
112. The requirements for acquiring tenure are discussed in part in Section I 1-1108 of
the School Code, which provides in part:
A temporary professional employee whose work has been certified by the district
superintendent to the secretary of the school district, during the last four (4)
months of the second year of such service, as being satisfactory shall thereafter
be a "professional employee" within the meaning of this article....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11-1108(b) (Purdon Aupp. 1983-84).
113. See supra note 80.
114. At least one union lawyer indicated that she believed the supreme court may limit
Neshaminy if asked to review another professional employee dismissal with facts not so over-
whelmingly against the teacher. Telephone Interview with Catherine C. O'Toole, former Staff
Attorney for PSEA (present General Counsel for the Washington [State] Education Associa-
tion) (October 14, 1983). Nevertheless, Neshaminy was a unanimous decision and the court
will probably not modify its decision in the near future. It is therefore incumbent on the state
legislature to implement any change in the Neshaminy result.
115. Section 510 of the Public School Code and section 702 of Act 195 guarantee the
district considerable discretion in managing its affairs. Section 510 of the School Code pro-
vides in part:
The Board of School Directors in any school district may adopt and enforce such
reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper, regarding
the management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment of all...
teachers . . . during the time they are engaged in their duties to the
district ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
Additionally, in the bargaining area, certain matters are not subject to bargaining. Sec-
tion 702 of Act 195 provides in part:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent man-
agerial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of dis-
cretion or policy as the functions and programs of the public employer, stan-
dards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational
structure, and selection and direction of personnel. ...
A School Code amendment that would change a school board
hearing in dismissal cases from a statutory mandate to an option of
the dismissed employee is one obvious solution."" Such an amend-
ment would upgrade the employee's rights in dismissal cases to a
level equal to demotions and suspensions," 7 so that the dismissed
tenured teacher would have the option of having his dismissal arbi-
trated, or proceeding with a school board hearing. For many years
an employee was required to request a school board hearing " before
he received one. The change in status of the hearing from optional to
mandatory evolved to ensure that the employee's dismissal was being
reviewed, rather than to prevent the employee from arbitrating his
dismissal."' Thus, while the legislature intended to provide more
protection for the tenured teacher, 20 the hearing requirement has
instead created a system of minimal protection"' for severe em-
ployer actions. Removing the requirement of a school board hearing
would return teacher protection from unfair dismissals to its previous
intended levels of protection.
A second solution is the recently proposed Hearing Examiner's
Bill, 2 2 which amends section 11-1127 of the School Code'28 and of-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
116. As of the date of this writing, legislators are considering the introduction of an
"Arbitration of Dismissals Bill," which would merely reverse the Neshaminy decision and al-
low dismissals to be arbitrated. The first proposal in this comment does not differ significantly
in form to such a bill, and would not differ at all in result.
117. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
118. Under the Tenure Law of 1937, a teacher who acquired tenure could have a hear-
ing upon dismissal, but only if he or she requested it. The former law provided in part:
Before any professional employee is dismissed . . . the school district shall fur-
nish such professional employee with a detailed written statement of the charges
upon which his or her dismissal . . . is based . . . [and] such professional em-
ployee will be given an opportunity to be heard either in person or by counsel or
both before the board of school directors ...
Act of April 6, 1937, Pub. L. 213, § 2, quoted In 21 PA. LEGIS. J. 2180 (1937) (emphasis
added).
The School Code enacted in 1949 altered the language so as to indicate that the board
"shall conduct a hearing." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
119. In 1949, when the School Code dismissal provisions were drafted, arbitration was
not a method for adjudicating public employee labor disputes. It is probable that the General
Assembly did not even consider that mandating a school board hearing would have the effect
of preventing grievance arbitration. Act 195, which favors arbitration, was not enacted until
1970. Thus, it is not logical to presume that the legislature intended to prevent an employee
from arbitrating his dismissal by mandating a school board hearing.
120. One can infer from the legislature's changing of the school board hearing from a
right, see supra note 119, to a requirement, that the legislature meant to provide additional
insurance that the professional employee would not be arbitrarily dismissed. At that time, a
school board hearing must have seemed to the legislature to be fair and adequate.
With the enactment of Act 195, however, the General Assembly apparently recognized
defects in many public employee procedural provisions, and thus created mandatory arbitra-
tion. The Neshaminy decision obviates the intent of Act 195, and assumes that the legislature
intended that dismissals not be arbitrable, even if circumstances changed. See also supra note
80 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
122. S. 519, 1983 Sess. § 3 (March 18, 1983).
123. See supra note 28.
fers an alternative forum for the review of dismissal actions that is
separate from either the arbitrator or the school board. 124 Employers
often perceive arbitrators as having a pro-employee bias,125 and the
neutral hearing examiner would provide what the name implies: a
neutral person chosen by the Secretary of Education to examine and
rule on the propriety of the dismissal. Review by the hearing exam-
iner would also be at the dismissed employee's option, thus eliminat-
ing the confusion caused by the current School Code dismissal sec-
tion. Since a hearing by a school board is not a totally unbiased
proceeding,'2 this forum for review should have the support of
teachers and teachers' unions. It should also satisfy employer school
districts, because the hearing examiner127 would be perceived as
more impartial than are arbitrators.
A third possible solution is the passage of a School Code
amendment whereby teachers would give up School Code dismissal
protections in exchange for "just cause" arbitration of all teacher job
security issues. While this amendment would undo an established as-
pect of the teacher tenure system, the foundation of teacher tenure,
the protection of employees from arbitrary employer actions, would
remain intact and flourish.
The General Assembly should analyze the merits of each of
these proposed solutions. All would return a significant degree of
protection to the professional employee. Nevertheless, the alteration
of a hearing from a mandate to a right is probably the simplest solu-
tion. 28 This was actually the practice until Neshaminy, and it has
worked well with suspensions and demotions.' 2 '
124. Senate Bill 519 would amend Section 11-1127, and provide for a hearing examiner
in dismissal cases. The Bill provides, among other things, that dismissed professional or tempo-
rary professional employees have the right to be notified of reasons for their dismissal, and are
entitled at their request, to a hearing before a neutral hearing examiner selected by the Secre-
tary of Education.
125. Arbitrators are selected from a list of seven people provided by the American Arbi-
tration Association or Bureau of Mediation. The employer strikes three names from the list
and the union strikes three names; the remaining name is the arbitrator who hears the case.
Since arbitrators are paid by both the employer and the union, an arbitrator cannot stay
in business if he is perceived by employers as pro-union. Nevertheless, arbitrators as a class
are, rightly or wrongly, sometimes viewed as leaning toward the sympathies of the employee.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
127. A former PSEA attorney stated that many other states have neutral hearing exam-
iners reviewing teacher dismissals, and that to her knowledge, Pennsylvania's school board
hearing system is definitely in the minority. Telephone Interview with Catherine C. O'Toole,
General Counsel for the Washington [State] Education Association (October 10, 1983).
128. It is the simplest solution for several reasons. First, the parties would not have to
make any changes in bargaining strategy or other action because they have been acting under
the presumption that a dismissal could be reviewed in either of the two forums. Second, it
would not require any lengthy committee hearings or reports, or delays due to the debate of
the merits, again because it has actually been in practice prior to Neshaminy. Additionally, it
would involve a scheme of legislation already known in Pennsylvania.
129. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
IV. Judicial Standards of Review in Neshaminy
A. Arbitrability
This comment has thus far focused on the impact of the
Neshaminy opinion that professional employee dismissals are not ar-
bitrable, which was actually the second matter addressed by the su-
preme court.'3 0 Ironically, however, the court never should have
reached the issue of arbitrability. It instead should have limited its
inquiry to whether the arbitrator's award rationally could have been
derived from the collective bargaining agreement.' 3' The proper time
for questions of arbitrability to be raised and decided is, logically,
before the parties proceed to arbitration, rather than after arbitra-
tion hearings are completed.
s2
Under Pennsylvania law, a party opposing arbitration may chal-
lenge the arbitrability of the dispute by seeking an injunction in the
court of common pleas.' Under the appropriate judicial inquiry,
only such matters will be excluded from arbitration as are specifi-
cally reserved by the parties in the collective bargaining agreement.
The court must decide only two questions: (1) was there an agree-
ment to arbitrate; (2) can it "be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause involved is not susceptible to an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute."'' The court may not expand its inquiry
because by doing so it may be deciding a substantive question that is
130. See Neshaminy, at 501 Pa. 547-50, 462 A.2d at 636-37.
131. See infra notes 163-171 and accompanying text.
132. Issues of arbitrability should generally not be decided after the parties have pro-
ceeded to arbitration. Otherwise, a party may be allowed to challenge arbitrability twice, both
before and after arbitration. A party could unfairly get two chances to prevail by arguing the
dispute on the merits, and then, if the decision is adverse to that party, by being afforded an
opportunity to challenge arbitrability of the dispute on appeal.
133. The opposing party may refuse to arbitrate and force the other party to file suit to
compel arbitration. Section 7304 of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides in part:
(a) Compelling arbitration.-On application to a court to compel arbitration
made by a party showing an agreement [to arbitrate] . ..and a showing that
an opposing party refused to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to pro-
ceed with arbitration. If the opposing party denies the existence of an agreement
to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to determine the issue so raised
and shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration if it finds for the moving
party. Otherwise, the application shall be denied.
(b) Stay of arbitration.- . .[T]he court may stay an arbitration on a showing
that there is no agreement to arbitrate. When in substantial and bona fide dis-
pute, such an issue shall be forthwith and summarily tried and determined and a
stay of the arbitration proceedings shall be ordered if the court finds for the
moving party. If the court finds for the opposing party, the parties shall proceed
with arbitration.
Act of October 5, 1983, Pub. L. No. 142, PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 7304 (Purdon Supp.
1983-84).
134. Lincoln Univ. v. Lincoln Univ. Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 467
Pa. 112, 119-23, 354 A,2d 576, 580-82. See also United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
properly within the jurisdiction of an arbitration. 18 5 Obviously, the
judicial standard is narrow; any dispute which is even arguably cov-
ered by the arbitration provision in question must be returned to the
arbitrator.'s'
In Neshaminy, the school district did challenge the arbitrability
of Hess's grievance by seeking a court injunction. The court of com-
mon pleas, without further opinion, refused to enjoin arbitration of
the dispute.137 Had the court issued an opinion, it would have un-
questionably had to find that the dispute was at least arguably cov-
ered by the agreement's discipline provision.138 Procedurally, then,
the Neshaminy school district was permitted to challenge arbi-
trability of the dispute before proceeding to arbitration. Substan-
tively, the court refused to enjoin arbitration and had to have deter-
mined that the dispute was arbitrable under the proper judicial
standard for inquiry.
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, a court may vacate an ar-
bitration award in limited circumstances. 89 Where the opposing
party did not seek to stay arbitration prior to arbitration hearings,
but nevertheless raised objections to arbitrability, that party may
seek to vacate the award in court.4 0 The Neshaminy school district
was, however, granted the opportunity to challenge arbitrability in a
135. See supra note 134.
136. See supra note 134.
137. The district's suit to enjoin arbitration was denied, without further opinion. On
appeal of the arbitration award, the court of common pleas stated that:
[the] District filed . . . a Complaint in Equity against . . . the Neshaminy Fed-
eration of Teachers and the American Arbitration Association requesting a tem-
porary order restraining the latter from holding a hearing. . . . The court rec-
ord of the case reflects merely that the application for a temporary order was
denied.
Neshaminy School Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed'n of Teachers, 34 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 216, 216-217
'(Comm. P1. 1980).
138. See supra note 12 for text of discipline provision. See infra notes 164-71 and ac-
companying text for discussion of the reasonableness of interpreting the discipline provision to
encompass dismissals.
In a suit to enjoin arbitration, a court may not determine the reasonableness of a proposed
contract interpretation, but only whether it can be said with positive assurance that the con-
tract is not subject to such an interpretation. The arbitrator will then conduct a more in-depth
inquiry into the agreement, and determine whether the parties actually intended to have the
dispute arbitrated. In Neshaminy, the arbitrator determined that the dispute was arbitrable
after consideration of several factors. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text. See also
ELKOURI, supra note 66 at 170-180.
139. The Uniform Arbitration Act provides in part:
(a) General Rule.
(1) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(v) there was no agreement to arbitrate and the issue of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate was not adversely determined in proceedings under sec-
tion 7304 (relating to proceedings to compel or stay arbitration) and the appli-
cant-party raised the issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate at the
hearing.
140. The standard of judicial inquiry is no more expansive at this stage than it would
have been in a suit to stay arbitration. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
suit to stay arbitration. Under the applicable provision of the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, the supreme court therefore could not have
vacated the arbitrator's award.1"1
A proper review of the arbitrator's award in Neshaminy should
have utilized the well-established "essence test,"" 2 and not the test
for determining arbitrability. In Neshaminy, the supreme court ap-
parently determined what the result of the case should be-that
Hess's dismissal be affirmed as being for just cause"--and then at-
tempted to find some law to support such a result.1 4' In so doing, the
court applied a test of arbitrability," 5 which was not appropriate in
this case. The Commonwealth Court's decision in the Neshaminy
case reviewed the arbitrator's award under the proper theory of law,
the "essence test." Nevertheless, the commonwealth court misap-
plied the "essence test" in reaching its decision to overturn the arbi-
trator's award. 4  The supreme court probably recognized this and
realized that it could not properly overturn the arbitrator's award
under the "essence test," and thus turned to a discussion of arbi-
trability. A correct application of the proper standard of judicial re-
view by both courts would have led to a different result: affirmation
of the arbitrator's award.
141. Under § 7302 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, a court "shall ... modify or cor-
rect the award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a
jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict." PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 7302 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
In Neshaminy, the district argued that the arbitrator's determination that Hess's dismis-
sal was not for just cause was illegal. Brief for the Neshaminy School District at § 4-28,
Neshaminy, supra note 9. This provision then is essentially designed to counter factual deter-
minations which are against the law by applying a judgment n.o.v. standard. The school dis-
trict did not challenge the legality of arbitrating dismissals under this section, nor did the
supreme court utilize the section in its analysis. Under the judgment n.o.v. standard of section
7302, the challenge to the legality of arbitrability is apparently beyond the scope of the
section.
142. See infra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
143. The arbitrator's determination that Hess' dismissal was for just cause is most ques-
tionable. But so long as that determination drew its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement, the courts could not properly reverse the arbitrator's award on the just cause
determination.
144. See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
145. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 539-50, 462 A.2d at 632-37.
146. The Commonwealth Court stated that the arbitrator incorrectly posed the issue as
whether Hess was dismissed for just cause, whereas he should have inquired as to whether
Hess was disciplined for just cause. After stating that "[tihe essence test requires a determina-
tion as to whether the terms of. . . agreement encompass the subject matter of the dispute,"
the court held that the dispute was not arbitrable because "discipline" and "dismissal" are not
interchangeable concepts, and the arbitrator addressed the issue of "dismissal" in his award.
Neshaminy, 59 Pa. Commw. 63, 67-68, 428 A.2d 1023, 1025 (1981).
The arbitrator, however, first determined that "dismissals" were covered by the "disci-
pline" clause, see infra notes 164-175 and accompanying text, and then concluded that the
dismissal was not for just cause. The commonwealth court, in determining that "dismissals"
were not covered by the "discipline" provision, substituted its interpretation of the provision
for that of the arbitrator. In so doing, the court violated the core of the "essence test." See
infra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
B. The Essence Test
Although it is well settled that an appellate court may not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator, " the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court apparently did just that in Neshaminy. Under the ac-
cepted standard of review, an appellate court may not overturn the
arbitrator's award so long as the award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement.14 8 The arbitrator exceeds his au-
thority only if he goes outside the terms of the agreement in granting
his award.1"" The "essence test" is an appropriate, court sanctioned
standard that has withstood the test of time.150 Legitimate contro-
versy arises only when courts misapply it.
15
C. Origin and History Of The Essence Test
The "essence test" originated in the private sector with the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in the Steelworkers' Tril-
ogy. 152 In announcing the "essence test," the Supreme Court held
that courts should not question the merits of a labor arbitration
award merely because their interpretation of the contract differed
from the arbitrator's interpretation. Although a thorough historical
review of the evolution of the "essence test" is outside the scope of
this comment, several important decisions' 5" in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania since the Steelworkers' Trilogy are noteworthy. In
Ludwig-Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher (Ludwig-Honold),'"4
147. See Scranton Federation of Teachers v. Scranton School Dist., 498 Pa. 58, 444
A.2d 1144 (1982); Leechburg Area School Dist. v, Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981);
Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203 (1978);
Bristol Twp. Educ. Ass'n v. Bristol Twp. School Dist., 74 Pa. Commw. 445, 460 A.2d 387
(1983); Greater Johnstown Area Vo-Tech School v. Greater Johnstown Area Vo-Tech Educ.
Ass'n, 69 Pa. Commw. 208, 450 A.2d 787 (1982).
148. See supra note 147.
149. See supra note 147.
150. See supra note 147.
151. Ironically, Justice Flaherty indicated his impatience with lower courts misapplying
the essence test only three years ago in Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424
A.2d 1309 (1981). Now Justice Flaherty joins the unanimous court in Neshaminy in misapply-
ing the essence test. In Leechburg, Justice Flaherty sharply stated:
I join the majority opinion with the hope that we have now made it clear, after
repeatedly so holding, that the ". . . arbitrator in analyzing (a) dispute may
have failed to properly perceive the question presented or erroneously resolved it,
but that does not provide justification for judicial interference. Our inquiry ends
once it is determined that the issue properly defined is within the terms of the
agreement."
So be it!
Id. at 522, 424 A.2d at 1313 (Flaherty, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
152. The Steelworkers Trilogy refers to United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
153. See supra note 147; see also Comment, Judicial Review, supra note I, at 802-11.
154. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
the award of an arbitrator was propelled to near-exalted status.1""
The court reasoned that the "essence test" is satisfied if the arbitra-
tor's interpretation...
can in any rational way be derived from the agreement viewed
in light of its language, its context, and other indicia of the par-
ties intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract con-
struction and the law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb
the award."'
Thus, the judicial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely
narrow.
With the enactment of Act 195 arbitration of public sector la-
bor disputes in Pennsylvania became mandatory.15 The Act did not,
however, prescribe any guidelines for the standard of judicial review
of the arbitrator's award. 158 After a series of Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cases attempted to establish a definite standard in the public
sector, 159 it appeared in the past several years that the supreme court
had conclusively settled on the "essence test." Nevertheless, courts
continue to cite the "essence test" as mandatory,1 60 and yet misapply
it' 61 or ignore it altogether." 2
155. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note I at 800. See supra notes 158-162 and
accompanying text.
156. Ludwig-Honold, 405 F.2d at 1128.
157. Section 903 of Act 195 provides in part:
Arbitration of disputes of grievances arising out of the interpretation of the pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The procedure to be
adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final steps
shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
158. In some states which have public labor relations acts, the statutes do contain stan-
dards for judicial review of arbitration awards. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1981);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474 (j) (3) (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26
979-M (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(42)(Callaghan 1983-84); WASH.
REV. CODE § 41.56.450 (West Supp. 1983-84).
159. After Act 195 was enacted, the commonwealth court had to determine the appro-
priate standard of review, and adopted the essence test. Teamsters Local Union No. 77 v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm., 17 Pa. Commw. 238, 331 A.2d 588 (1975). In subsequent
years, however, the Pennsylvania appellate courts adopted different standards of review. See
International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 465 Pa. 356, 366,
350 A.2d 804, 809 (1976) (court did not adopt a standard because the arbitrator's construc-
tion of the agreement was reasonable); Community College of Beaver County v. Community
College, Society of Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977) (judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and illegality standards applied to arbitrator's determination); Leechburg Area
School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203 (1977) (Beaver County
standard ignored); County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Indep. Union,
476 Pa. 27, 381 A.2d 849 (1979) (essence test applied). For a complete analysis of the adop-
tion of a standard for reviewing an arbitrator's award, see Comment, Judicial Review, supra
note 1, at 802-10.
160. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
162. Although discussing the "essence test," the court in Neshaminy actually decided
the issue of arbitrability of professional employee dismissals using a pre-arbitration arbi-
trability standard. See supra notes 129-161 and accompanying text. Issues of arbitrability
D. Applying The Essence Test
If it had properly applied the "essence test," the Neshaminy
court should have affirmed the arbitrator's award. Even if the court
unanimously agreed that the arbitrator's interpretation was wrong, it
should not have substituted its judgment for that of the arbitrator.
After reading the collective bargaining agreement as a whole, and
considering all relevant indicia of the parties' intentions,16 a the arbi-
trator reasonably concluded that (1) dismissals are included in the
just cause discipline clause, and (2) Hess' dismissal was not for "just
cause."
1. The Ordinary Meaning of Discipline.-When construing a
written document, the factfinder attempts to give words or phrases
their clear and normal meaning. 16' In Neshaminy, the collective bar-
gaining agreement provided that "an employee will not be disci-
plined ...without just cause. Any such actions asserted by the
Board . . .should be subject to the grievance procedure. . . ." The
average person most likely views dismissal as a type, or subset, of
discipline."" Dismissal is actually the ultimate form of discipline in
the employer-employee relationship.1 In Neshaminy, the school dis-
trict contended that discipline means the strengthening of the mind
or the building of character within an employee and that a dismissal
is not an action consistent with this definition. 167 This, however, is
should be resolved prior to arbitration.
163. See supra notes 66, 156 and accompanying text.
164. If the language of a collective bargaining agreement is clear and unambiguous, an
arbitrator must not give those words in question an interpretation other than that clearly ex-
pressed. ELKOURI supra, note 66 at 303.
In ELKOURI, the authors discussed the standard that arbitrators must give words their
plain and ordinary meaning.
Arbitrators give words their ordinary and popularly accepted meaning in the
absence of anything indicating that they were used in a different sense or that
the parties intended some special colloquial meaning. For instance, the word
"may" has been given its ordinary "permissive" meaning in absence of strong
evidence that a mandatory meaning was intended. The words "day" or "work-
day" ordinarily must be construed as a calendar day, from midnight to
midnight.
Id. at 305-06 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, if possible, the arbitrator in Neshaminy had a duty to give the term "discipline" its
ordinary meaning when interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.
165. Just as "may" ordinarily denotes a permissive meaning, the ordinary meaning of
"discipline," especially used in the context of a contract job security provision, is "punish-
ment" or "reprimand." A dismissal is certainly a form of punishment; it is the most severe
form of punishment that an employer may inflict on an employee.
166. The arbitrator stated in has award that "conventionally discharge may be viewed
as the ultimate application of discipline. The cliche 'industrial capital punishment' has been
used to describe discharge ...Discharge obviously is the ultimate form of discipline and
therefore must be reviewed as being inherent in (the just cause discipline provision)." Arbitra-
tion Award, supra note 22, at 8-9.
167. Brief for Neshaminy School District at 13-14, Neshaminy Federation of Teachers
v. Neshaminy School District, supra note 9.
but one type of discipline: the type that a football coach employs to
instill mental toughness or determination in his players, for exam-
ple.1" The provision in the collective bargaining agreement, how-
ever, did not refer to this type of discipline. Rather, the definition of
"discipline" as "to punish or chastise"1'" is more consistent with the
term as it is used in the contract.
The Neshaminy School District recognized in its own "Work
Regulations and Guidelines" this definition of discipline which
stated: "[t]he following are representative causes of disciplinary ac-
tion, including dismissal .... ,,1o Thus, the District admitted that a
dismissal was indeed a form of discipline; the "Work Regulations
and Guidelines" was a clear indication of the parties' intentions in
the collective bargaining agreement.1 7' The arbitrator was therefore
reasonable in his conclusion that dismissals were included in the dis-
cipline provision.
2. Accepted Practice of Arbitrating Dismis-
sals.-Additionally, in light of the supreme court decisions in Phila-
delphia Federation of Teachers and Pittsburgh, as well as the pre-
vailing view of school districts statewide that dismissals were
arbitrable172 and that section 703 of Act 195 would not operate to
168. Were an arbitrator to apply this interpretation to the "discipline" provision, the
contract would produce harsh and absurd results. Under this interpretation, an employer could
give an employee an official written reprimand if he committed some infraction of school dis-
trict policy. This would be discipline under the Neshaminy School District's argument. If the
employee committed a second offense, the employer could demote the employee, and this too
would be a form of discipline. A third offense could lead to a disciplinary suspension, again a
form of discipline. But, if on the fourth offense, the employer fired the employee, the employer
could contend that this is not discipline. Thus, an employee could file a grievance under the
first three disciplinary actions, but not when ultimately dismissed, an absurd result that allows
comparatively minor employer actions to trigger the grievance procedure, but not the ultimate
employer action. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
As one commentator states, "[wihen one interpretation of an ambiguous contract would
lead to harsh, absurd, or nonsensical results, while an alternative interpretation, equally consis-
tent, would lead to just and reasonable results, the latter interpretation will be used."
ELKOURI, supra note 66, at 309 (footnote omitted). Elkouri illustrates this standard of inter-
pretation with the phrase "active employ." Under this standard, interpretation of "active em-
ploy" would have an absurd result if persons who were absent from work on a specified day
due to illness or other valid reason were said not to be in the "active employ" of the company.
169. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 237 (7th Ed. 1967).
170. Neshaminy School District, Work Regulations and Guidelines, quoted in Arbitra-
tion Award, supra note 22, at 5.
171. The District's Work Regulation and Guidelines was not a provision of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. It was, however, a statement of policy by the District that set forth
standards for disciplinary action, which, as the District stated, included dismissals. Thus, the
Work Regulations and Guidelines are not only helpful for determining the District's definition
of the term "discipline" in the abstract, but are clear evidence that the District intended disci-
pline to include dismissals in the precise issue dealt with in the Neshaminy case.
172. In Comment, A Power Shift, supra note 1, the author discussed the impact of the
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers decision on the arbitrability of grievances:
Although appellant in Philadelphia Federation of Teachers was a nontenured
teacher, the legal and policy arguments the court advanced apply equally to the
dismissal of a tenured teacher for just cause. Since two of the cases upon which
void a dismissal clause,17 it was reasonable to conclude that the par-
ties intended dismissals to be arbitrable.1 7" As previously stated, by
the mere inclusion of the "not-to-supersede-applicable-law" provi-
sion, the District could not conceivably have intended that dismissals
not be covered in the collective bargaining agreement, especially
since such language never before had operated in such a manner. 7
Thus, even reading this clause as having great meaning, it still
appears that the parties' intentions were that dismissals be included
in arbitration. Considering the ordinary usage of the terms "dismis-
sal" and "discipline," the District's own admission that discipline in-
cludes dismissal, as well as accepted practice, it was reasonable for
the arbitrator to hold that "dismissals" were indeed included in the
collective bargaining agreement.
E. The Reasonableness Of The Arbitrator's "Just Cause"
Determination
I. Compatability of "Just Cause" Standard and Statutory
Causes for Dismissal.-Having determined that "dismissals" were
properly included within the contract's "discipline" clause, the arbi-
trator focused on whether the dismissal was for "just cause." If a
statute prescribes standards for an employer action and the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement nevertheless negotiate a "just
cause" clause with respect to that action, the supreme court will up-
hold the "just cause" provision under two constructions. 17' Absent
evidence to the contrary, the court will presume: (1) that the arbitra-
the court relied involved tenured teachers, it appears that a teacher, tenured or
nontenured, can elect a hearing before an arbitrator rather than the school
board.
The procedures for a hearing dismissing a tenured teacher are more detailed and
offer greater procedural safeguards than a hearing under Section 514 of the
School Code. The conclusion that a school board is not illegally delegating its
authority by submitting a dismissal to binding arbitration applies equally, how-
ever, to the dismissal of a tenured teacher.
Id. at 816, 816 n.179 (footnote omitted).
173. In West Shore School Dist. v. Bowman, 48 Pa. Commw,. 104, 409 A.2d 474
(1979), the district argued that an employee was required to submit her grievance over her
dismissal to arbitration, pursuant to a "just cause dismissal" provision. Id. at 108, 409 A.2d at
477. The court held that the matter did not have to be submitted arbitration because the
dispute dealt solely with whether the professional employee's discharge violated procedural
rights guaranteed by the School Code. In recognizing that different issues might have brought
the dismissal under the grievance procedure, the court reasoned that...
[h]ad Bowman's appeal to the Secretary [of Education] been concerned solely
with the substantive reasons for her termination, the matter would be arguably
arbitrable . . . [but] [blecause we are concerned with procedure -nd-bcause
the collective bargaining agreement does not contain provisions relating to termi-
nation procedures, this matter is not a proper one for arbitration.
Id. at 109, 409 A.2d at 478.
174. See Arbitration Award, supra note 22, at 24-29.
175. See supra notes 52, 72, 99-100 and accompanying text.
176. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. at 102-106, 346 A.2d at 41-43.
tor's "just cause" standard is identical to the statutory reasons or,
(2) that the "just cause" standard includes the statutory reasons and
other additional reasons. 17 Thus, in Neshaminy, the "just cause"
standard would be interpreted as "immorality" or as including "im-
morality" and other acceptable reasons for dismissal. Under the sec-
ond standard, then, the court will review the employer's action more
broadly, and thus the tradeoff of a board hearing for arbitration will
be equitable.
2. Application of these Standards.-In Neshiminy, the arbi-
trator concluded that Mr. Hess's dismissal was not for just cause
because of several factors.178 The school district's dismissal of Hess
was discriminatory, considering its less severe treatment of other
seemingly immoral offenses.1 9 For example, four months prior to
Hess's arrest, the Board President became drunk and broke into his
former wife's house. Within a week he repeated his action. He was
arrested on both occasions, but continued to serve on the Board with
impunity. 80 Additionally, a teacher who exposed his genitals to a
female student, and a male teacher who struck a female teacher
were not dismissed.'
81
Furthermore, the record indicated that Hess's behavior did not
stir the wrath of the community. Surprisingly, it does not even ap-
pear that the community was aroused. 182 Hess continued to teach
after the incident without causing problems for the District or for
the students. The arbitrator concluded that the incident occurred
outside the school setting and evidently had little impact on the pub-
lic, the students, or Hess' ability to teach.8 "
177. Id.
178. See infra notes 179-188 and accompanying text.
179. The arbitrator concluded that there must be "some demonstration that all other
teachers were subject to the same standards of scrutiny and evaluation." Arbitration Award,
supra note 22, at 25. In discussing the treatment of a Board President who had been twice
arrested for trespassing while intoxicated in his ex-wife's house, the arbitrator reasoned that
"it is difficult to attempt to weigh the lesser crimes of the Board President and his much lesser
punishment with the fate of Mr. Hess. Suffice it to say, both were ill, both accepted treatment
and hopefully both are whole." Arbitration Award, supra note 22, at 25-26.
180. The Board President stepped down from his office as President, but remained a
Board member. The Board took no action to have him discharged from the Board. Id. at 22.
Somewhat ironically, he voted to discharge Mr. Hess. Id.
181. Several months after exposing his genitals to a female student, the teacher was
involved in "another incident" with the same student. He was then permitted to resign. Id. The
male teacher who struck his female colleague received a reprimand. Id.
182. On this point the arbitrator concluded that Mr. Hess's behavior had not caused
problems for the District or students. "The one newspaper clipping [mislidentified Bensalem
[School District] as his employer. That community actually has been employing him with no
apparent ill effects. If anything, this combination of a faulty news item and his employment by
Bensalem simply strengthens the belief that the incident had little impact and that the public
has short memory in these matters." Id. at 25-26.
183. The Board originally included "incompetence" as a ground for Hess's dismissal,
but dropped this argument at the Board hearings. Id. at 25.
The arbitrator also reasoned that the cause of Hess's actions on
the night of September 24, 1978 was not immorality, evil, or wicked-
ness, but was, rather, an illness'l 4-alcoholism. 18 At the time of
Hess's dismissal, he was well on the road to recovery. 1" The arbitra-
tor viewed Hess' actions as those of a sick man who needed help, not
an immoral man who deserved punishment. Of his own free will,
Hess sought and received help and was, at the time of his dismissal,
a rehabilitated man. 87 Since his teaching ability did not suffer, and
the court of common pleas punishment was less severe than the pun-
ishment by the Board,188 the arbitrator was arguably within the lim-
its of reason in concluding that Hess' dismissal was not for "just
cause." 1
89
F. Reasons Behind The Neshaminy Decision
If the arbitrator's decision was, in fact, "rationally derived from
the collective bargaining agreement," then the supreme court deci-
sion was in error. This case probably presented the court with facts
upon which it felt it could not allow the grievant's dismissal to be
overturned.' 90 A factual view of the incidents of the night of Septem-
ber 24, 1978 would reasonably lead the ordinary person to believe
that a person who committed the same acts as Hess should not be
teaching young school children."" The court cannot be criticized for
its conclusion that Hess should have been dismissed. Nevertheless,
184. Today, alcoholism is recognized as a disease, rather than a moral or social abnor-
mality. See generally National Institute of Mental Health and National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, Recent Advances in Studies of Alcoholism: An Interdisciplinary Sym-
posium (1970).
185. The arbitrator reasoned that Hess' acts "were the acts of a sick man. Alcoholism is
an illness. Society is best served if the illness is cured rather than if all acts resulting from the
illness are punished." Arbitration Award, supra note 22, at 27.
186. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
187. The arbitration award reveals that Hess showed "all the signs of rehabilitation. He
went to . . .all avail [sic] forms of therapy and rehabilitation: an alcoholic treatment center,
AA, a psychiatrist, and marriage counseling. . . .He no longer drinks. That is a key to reha-
bilitation." Arbitration Award, supra note 22, at 28.
188. The arbitrator concluded that there was a disparity between the fifteen days of
limited confinement to which he was sentenced by the court, and termination of his employ-
ment which was imposed by the District. Id. at 28-29.
189. See Arbitration Award, supra note 22, at 25-30.
190. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
191. Legal staffs for labor unions have an obligation to represent the interests of their
members by representing the interests of the union as a whole. When an employee alleges
wrongful dismissal, the union will review the case and determine whether the facts merit tak-
ing the case to arbitration. Before deciding to arbitrate the grievance, it must balance the
grievant's chances of success against the potential consequences to the organization as a whole
should an appellate court review the case and reject the union's argument.
Obviously, when looking at the case in retrospect, the facts in Neshaminy were such that
the Federation of Teachers should not have appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. It
would have been prudent, instead for the Federation not to have appealed the case because: (1)
it was foreseeable that the court might hold against Hess because of the bad facts of the case;
and (2) such a holding could result in unforeseen damage to the union's aims, which are
broader than Hess' interests.
the Neshaminy decision was essentially result-oriented, and its ulti-
mate result is in derogation of the principles of teacher tenure.
192
Furthermore, by declaring that the "essence test" is the proper
standard of review and yet reviewing the arbitrator's award under an
arbitrability test, the supreme court has demonstrated its inability to
nail down the "essence test," both in theory and in practice.
Neshaminy creates new confusion that may take years to resolve. As
previously noted, it has only seemed clear that appellate courts were
applying the "essence test" in the public sector in the past several
years. 193 The court in Neshaminy quoted the "essence test,"'' 94 and
yet fully reviewed the arbitrator's award on the merits, because of
either a misapplication of or dissatisfaction with the "essence
test".
95
G. The Essence Test-Is It Appropriate In The Public Sector?
The "essence test" is not the universally accepted proper stan-
dard of review of arbitration awards in the public sector.' 96 Propo-
nents of a broader standard of review argue that since arbitration in
the public sector is mandatory,' rather than agreed to by the par-
ties at the bargaining stage, the scope of review should therefore be
broader. 98 Although this argument has superficial appeal, it is actu-
ally without merit.
The General Assembly, by enacting Act 195 and making public
sector arbitration mandatory, has in essence contracted on behalf of
all public employers and employees to utilize arbitration to resolve
192. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
194. Neshaminy, 501 Pa. at 540-41, 462 A.2d at 632.
195. In Neshaminy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that interpreting "disci-
pline" to include "dismissal" was untenable. Id. at 542, 462 A.2d at 633. The court reasoned
that the mere mention of the term "dismissal" in another section of the agreement refuted the
contention that the parties intended to include "dismissals" within the "discipline" clause. Id.
at 543-44, 462 A.2d at 634. The court stated further that analysis of the School Code dismis-
sal provisions, see supra notes 28, 29, and section 703 of Act 195 "compels the conclusion that
[the contract] must be interpreted as excluding 'dismissal' from mandatory arbitration." Id. at
547, 462 A.2d at 635. The court reached this conclusion because of its reliance on the parties'
agreement not to supersede the School Code. Id. at 542-43, 462 A.2d at 633-34.
It is unimportant here to determine whether the Neshaminy court's conclusion on the
parties' intent was reasonable, because, as discussed, supra, at text accompanying notes 130-
136, the court should not even have attempted to make such an analysis. Under the "essence
test," the court had to determine whether the arbitrator's interpretation could in any way be
derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia
of the parties' intention . . ." Id. at 540-41, 462 A.2d at 632 (quoting Ludwig-Honold, 405
F.2d at 1128) (emphasis added). The arbitrator's award did not have to be the most reasona-
ble interpretation of the agreement provision; it merely has to be a reasonable interpretation.
Nevertheless, the Neshaminy court concluded that "we are satisfied that the terms of the
Agreement do not encompass the. . . dismissal of a tenured employee." Id. at 541, 462 A.2d
at 632 (emphasis added).
196. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 811-15.
197. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
198. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 811-12.
all disputes. Thus, mandatory arbitration should not be reviewed dif-
ferently from voluntary arbitration. In addition, merely prescribing
the forum and method for review of disputes does not make public
sector arbitration any less suitable or more likely to be in error than
private sector arbitration. Thus, no reason exists to scrutinize more
closely the arbitrator's award in the public sector.
Additionally, the purpose of arbitration is to provide an alterna-
tive forum to the courts for dispute resolution. A broad standard of
review encourages appeals to state courts and undermines the con-
cept of binding arbitration. There is little reason at all to have arbi-
tration if the courts are going to give the arbitrator's award a full
scale review; binding arbitration will be turned into non-binding ar-
bitration. The parties to the contract know in advance that matters
of dispute will be arbitrated and neither party is surprised or disad-
vantaged by resolving disputes in this forum.
Finally, the taxpayers are paying for the litigation that follows
arbitration. Where binding arbitration works well, there is no reason
to allow a broad standard of review resulting in increased cost to
taxpayers, through increased appeals, more crowded court dockets,
increased time in resolving disputes and ultimately, more uncertainty
in matters of public sector labor law. 19
V. Conclusion
In handing down the decision in Neshaminy and stating that the
dismissal of a professional employee is not arbitrable, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court's legacy is a situation in which allegations of se-
rious offenses are provided with less protection than allegations of
minor ones. 00 Furthermore, nontenured teachers have greater pro-
tection than those with tenure by being afforded the opportunity to
arbitrate their dismissals.20 1 It is inconceivable that the Legislature
could have ever intended this inequity in protection levels when it
enacted the Public School Code and Act 195.
. The burden is now on Pennsylvania's state lawmakers to rectify
this imbalance and compensate for the harshness of Neshaminy. The
Legislature should act to change the mandatory board hearing to a
voluntary process,20 2 thus providing all dismissed employees under
the School Code with a choice of forums for reviewing their dismis-
sals. Other School Code alternatives which are worthy of considera-
tion include the review of all dismissals by a Neutral Hearing Exam-
199. But see Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 1.
200. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 80-88 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
iner,203 and the forfeiture by employees of tenure protections in
exchange for the arbitration of all job security issuesy
°4
Once it is agreed that the arbitration is the proper forum for the
review of employer actions, state appellate courts must hesitate to
overturn arbitrators' awards. The "essence test" for reviewing arbi-
tration awards is appropriate in the public sector 05 and will lead to
an efficient system of adjudication if Pennsylvania's appellate courts
adhere to it, both in name and in application. Had this been the
accepted view when the supreme court decided Neshaminy, the case
would never have advanced to the state's highest court.
If the Legislature acts promptly, and the state appellate courts
settle into a consistent pattern of application of the "essence test,"
the original purpose for teacher tenure will be accomplished. Less
confusion will follow the area of public sector labor law, and it will,
in turn, have a chance to succeed.
J. ERIC RATHBURN
203. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.

